Independent Medical Examinations:  Are They Futile? - Back to Table of Contents - Back to WC Index
    By: Gary L. Borah (Springfield)

In recent years, the Industrial Commission has shown an increased tendency to give greater weight to the opinions of treating physicians over those of examining physicians. This tendency is frustrating as examining physicians often are more objective and honest in their opinions than are treating physicians, who naturally want to help their patients win their claims. Further, whether the patient's claim is won or lost often determines whether the treating physician's bill gets paid. Thus, the Commission's practice of accepting treating physicians' opinions over examining physicians' opinions is frequently unjustified.

Because the Commission frequently discounts the opinions of examiners, respondents sometimes view independent medical examinations (IMEs) as a waste of time and money. Certainly, an IME is not needed on every case. And, a recent decision by the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed that unrebutted medical testimony by a treating physician need not be accepted by the Industrial Commission, especially where it is impeached by other facts in the case.  In Fickas v. Industrial Comm'n, 308 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 721 N.E.2d 1165 (4th Dist. 1999), the facts of the injury suggested that there was no causal relationship, and the Industrial Commission specifically found that the treating physician was not a credible witness. The appellate court held that the Industrial Commission is not bound to accept unrebutted medical testimony.

Notwithstanding this ruling, where there is an unrebutted medical opinion which is challenged or contested, an independent medical examiner's opinion should be solicited and presented into evidence. When possible, the physician selected should be one who has a good reputation with the Industrial Commission. "Hired gun" IME physicians seldom have any value to the successful defense of a claim.

One should attempt to posture the evidence such that a sound argument can be made to give greater weight to the examiner's opinion than that of the treater. It is often possible to provide more critical facts to the examining physician than are known to the treating physician. Treating physicians regularly offer causal connection opinions without any significant knowledge of the facts of the occurrence. Treaters may not know how a repetitive task is performed, the number of times it is performed, or the weights and sizes of objects which are handled. Providing these details to the examining physician enables the examining physician to make a more informed opinion on causation than the treating physician. Job site evaluations and job performance videos are particularly useful tools for use by examining physicians.

When possible, find an examining physician with greater credentials than those of the treating physician. Find a well-recognized specialist who deals only in the condition which is the subject of the claim, or find the chairman of a department at a prestigious medical school. Find the author of seminal articles on the conditions or procedures which are the subject of your claim. Put some time and effort into selecting the best possible expert for your case.

All other factors being equal, it is better to use a local physician than one out of the area.  However, there should be no reluctance to use an out-of-town physician who enjoys a good reputation with the Industrial Commission or who has unique credentials to evaluate the claim. With the careful selection of the examiner, IMEs are not futile. As always, the attorneys at Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen are happy to discuss with you any concerns you may have regarding the selection of an independent medical examiner.

Inquiries To Traveling Employees - Back to Table of Contents - Back to WC Index
    By:  Bruce L. Bonds (Urbana)

Two recent appellate decisions address the compensability of injuries to a traveling employee who is engaged in a voluntary
recreational activity. Interestingly, both cases dealt with injuries while driving all terrain vehicles, "ATVs" supplied by the employer outside of the State of Illinois.

In Bagcraft Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 302 Ill. App. 3d 334, 705 N.E. 2d 919 (3d Dist. 1998), reh'g denied (Feb. 17. 1999), petitioner was at the lodge of a company that supplied paper products to respondent. After business meetings, petitioner availed himself of the recreational facilities provided and was driving an ATV on the supplier's property. He had an accident on the ATV and was killed. The Arbitrator, Commission, Circuit Court and Appellate Court each found the decedent was a traveling employee and that riding an ATV was a reasonable and foreseeable activity. The court held that § 11 of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act, which prohibits recovery for accidental injuries incurred while an employee participates in voluntary recreational programs, does not abrogate the traveling employee doctrine. Thus, a traveling employee, who voluntarily participates in a recreational activity is not automatically barred from recovery under § 11 of the Act.

Recently, in a remarkably similar case, Jensen v. Industrial Comm'n, 305 Ill. App. 3d 274, 711 N.E.2d 1129 (1st Dist. 1999), appeal denied, 185 Ill. 2d 628, 720 N.E.2d 1093 (1999), the court denied benefits to an employee injured on an employer-provided ATV. In Jensen, petitioner was a copilot who was an employee of an aircraft corporation. From time-to-time, petitioner would fly the employer's jet to his resort in Northern Michigan. Sometimes petitioner would stay until the return flight. On August 7, 1991, petitioner flew to the resort and as the return trip was scheduled on August 11, he stayed on the property. While there, he was allowed to use the employer's recreational vehicles. On August 9, petitioner and a co-employee decided to ride the ATVs to an unfamiliar area of the 5000 acre resort. Petitioner was offered a helmet but refused to wear it. The co-employee testified petitioner drove recklessly and at excessive speed. The two became separated and when the co-employee caught up to petitioner he found that he had hit a tree and had been seriously injured.

Accepting that because petitioner was a traveling employee under Bagcraft, §11 did not bar the compensability of this claim, the issue became the reasonableness of his conduct. All parties agreed that the petitioner's participation in the use of the recreational vehicles was reasonable and foreseeable. However, the court went on to find that the manner in which petitioner participated in this recreational activity was unreasonable and unforeseeable and benefits were denied. The court viewed several factors in reaching this conclusion. Initially, the court noted that petitioner planned to ride the ATV into an area he had never ridden before. Equally important was the fact that, at the time of the accident, petitioner was driving on a county road and was not technically on the employer's property and was also unfamiliar with the roads. The Court further noted petitioner did not wear a helmet even though one had been offered. A co-worker also opined that petitioner was driving too fast and recklessly. Finally, the road where the accident occurred was very dusty. Based on these facts, the Appellate Court could not state that the Commission decision denying benefits was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Justice Holdridge filed a dissent in this 3/2 decision. First, he noted petitioner had learned to ride an ATV on a prior trip to the employer's estate. Holdridge noted that petitioner had ridden the ATV on the estate several times before the accident and had never ridden with a helmet. Holdridge also emphasized that the employer had provided the ATV for petitioner's use.

Additionally, Holdridge did not feel that the speed alone necessitated finding that the conduct was unreasonable. Holdridge's opinion seems to be based on a policy concern that the majority needlessly introduced the concept of contributory negligence into the determination of compensability for traveling employees. Of course, one of the reasons for the existence of workers' compensation laws is to eliminate the defenses of contributory negligence and assumed risk.

From these two decisions, it is important to be aware that a traveling employee injured while involved in a voluntary recreational activity would not automatically be denied benefits under § 11. To properly evaluate such a claim, the focus should be not just on the reasonableness and foreseeability of the activity the petitioner is involved in at the time of the accident, but on the reasonableness and foreseeability of the manner in which the activity is undertaken.

Eroding The Standard Of Proof In Repetitive Trauma Cases - Back to Table of Contents - Back to WC Index
    By:  James A. Telthorst (Edwardsville)

Illinois law first recognized the compensability of repetitive trauma injuries in 1987. In the early cases, the courts and the Industrial Commission regarded repetitive trauma as "body motions" or "activities" that the employee might perform hundreds or even thousands of times daily over extended periods of time. Repetitive type injuries were still required to meet the same threshold issues of "arising out of" and "in the course of" the employment as a typical single traumatic event. However, there appears to be a trend developing that the Industrial Commission is willing to find compensable injuries due to work activities performed by employees on a much less frequent basis.

The seminal case in repetitive trauma injuries is Peoria County Belwood Nursing Home v. Industrial Comm'n, 115 Ill. 2d 524, 505 N.E.2d 1026 (1987). In Belwood, the evidence was undisputed that petitioner had worked for respondent for 12 years, the last 6 six years in the laundry room. Her duties required her to carry bags of laundry weighing between 25 and 50 pounds. They were sorted, and she would load two 200-pound capacity washing machines by operating a spring-loaded door into each of three compartments. She loaded the washing machines at least six times each day, thus requiring her to handle pieces of laundry hundreds of times daily. Petitioner developed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, which was believed by petitioner's physician to be a direct cause from her aforementioned job duties.  The Illinois Supreme Court held that petitioner's injuries were compensable. Cases decided by Illinois courts in the initial years following Belwood seemed to adhere to a similar standard.

This trend seemed to reach its zenith in the case of Williams v. Industrial Comm'n, 244 Ill. App. 3d 204, 614 N.E.2d 177 (1st Dist. 1993). For nine of his first ten years of petitioner's employment, claimant worked as a crane operator and was required to climb in and out of a crane cab several times during his shift. For the last 12 years, he worked as a millwright, where he lifted machine parts that weighed anywhere from 30 to 60 or 70 pounds about two times a day, and he estimated that he spent approximately 30% of his time on each shift lifting objects of this weight range. He would climb, crawl under certain machinery, and lay on his back two to three hours per day on a daily or weekly basis, and use 8-, 12-and 16-pound sledgehammers for two to three hours a day on a daily basis. He was required to operate a hydraulic air hammer to break up concrete approximately once every six months, and utilized various sizes and weights of tools including pipe wrenches, chain saws, sledgehammers and box wrenches.

Although petitioner would perform no single activity constantly and continually throughout the day, he argued that he would perform a limited number of rigorous tasks in awkward positions on a regular cycle over a period of 12 years. The court upheld the Commission's denial of benefits, noting that there was no single task performed on a regular or daily basis. Williams confirmed the rationale used in prior decisions focusing on the fact that repetitive trauma would require petitioner to perform the offending motions or activities on a daily and almost continuous basis.

In more recent years, the Industrial Commission has shown a disturbing trend in finding instances of repetitive trauma with much less proof. In Ellington v. Mitsubishi Motor Manuf. Co., 98-IIC-1118, petitioner worked as a vehicle tester in respondent's environmental emissions laboratory. Petitioner's job duties would require him to retrieve a car from the shipping line and drive into the emissions department, where he would crawl beneath the car and affix a strap to tighten it down. He also had  other tasks like lifting the hood, crawling under the car to drain the fuel tank and checking various parts. All of these tasks were performed by a three-person team, the members of which would rotate through the various tasks.

Petitioner testified that he and his crew would complete an average of six to eight cars per day, and on busy schedules, between 12 and 14 cars. Petitioner acknowledged that these tasks all involved different movements and different parts of the body. The  Commission majority found that petitioner sustained injuries to his shoulder as a result of repetitive trauma, despite the fact that petitioner could not identify one single activity that he would do on a regular and continuous basis. Furthermore, this was also in light of the fact that these duties would be divvied up between two other team members on a daily basis.

A similar decision was reached in Pople v. Mitsubishi Motor Manuf. Co., 99-IIC-421. Petitioner testified that he would work a particular job for two hours then take a break or lunch then work another two hours followed by another break, and would run through a number of different tasks on a daily basis. Most of his day involved standing on his feet with some walking while work on his hands and knees was minimal. Petitioner testified that he had lots of rotations and breaks and that he was not in any one position for any extended time. In fact, petitioner conceded that he only ended up doing the same job every four days. Petitioner developed bilateral foot pain in the region of his large toe, and eventually surgery was performed on both feet in order to remove bone spurs and inflamed bursa in the ball of each foot. In a 2-to-1 decision, the Commission found petitioner's injuries to be compensable and that his foot conditions were caused by the combination of walking on concrete floors, pivoting and pushing with his feet while working on the assembly line.

Most recently, in Drexel Schneedle v. Maryville Manor, 96-WC-00842, petitioner was employed as a Care Plan Coordinator and would spend about half of her day in meetings developing customized plans for the care and treatment of each resident. After completing the assigned number of meetings per day, petitioner would then use a computer which kept a database on each resident. In order to make entries into this system, petitioner would spend about two to three hours of her day on the computer typing either "x's" or "o's" on a hunt and peck basis. There would be little if any continuous typing. The arbitrator found petitioner's bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by her job duties.

The level of proof used in these recent decisions by the Industrial Commission in finding a repetitive trauma type injury are a far cry from the early cases of Belwood and its progeny.  If this trend continues, a petitioner will have to do little but allege that any activity performed in his job, no matter how often or how long, can cause or contribute to the development of certain stress type injuries. Employers will need to continue to contest these types of cases and be willing to press them to the highest authority as practical. Time and motion studies of an employee's job duties may be needed to offer as rebuttal evidence to a claim of repetitive trauma. An employee's health history should also be carefully scrutinized to look for other possible causes of the alleged repetitive injury. Finally, employers should continue, where practical, to minimize the performance of repetitive duties by employees when the jobs could be conducive to the development of repetitive type injuries.

FROM THE APPELLATE CORNER - Back to Table of Contents

Understanding the Initial Appeal Process from the Industrial Commission to the Circuit Court - Back to WC Index
    By:  Brad A. Elward (Peoria)

At Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, all of our workers' compensation appeals are prepared by an appellate practitioner who concentrates in handling workers' compensation cases on review. Usually our appellate counsel's first contact with our client is the initial letter recommending further review following an adverse decision by the Industrial Commission. That review is first filed with the circuit court and then to the Appellate Court, Industrial Commission Division, a panel specifically charged with the handling of appellate workers' compensation cases. The Appellate Court, Industrial Commission Division, consists of five justices, one from each appellate district. The panel remains the same from year-to-year unless one of the justices retires, or requests removal.

To better enable us to handle your workers' compensation appeals, we thought a little primer would be helpful, emphasizing what happens when a case is to be reviewed before the circuit court and, more importantly, reiterating the significantly shortened time frames for action, which if not complied with, can be fatal to an appeal.

Reviews to the circuit court are generally referred to as "administrative reviews" and are categorized by the circuit court's as "MR" cases - short for miscellaneous review. Administrative reviews are governed by 820 ILCS 305/19(f). To begin, any appeal from an Industrial Commission decision to the circuit court must be filed within 20 days of the date the decision is received by counsel. There is no procedure for obtaining an extension nor is there a "safety valve" provision as there is for general civil appeals. To perfect the administrative review, five documents must be filed: (1) the written request for commencement of proceedings (this is your complaint for review); (2) a bond, signed by the employer and a surety (usually the insurer); (3) summons to the petitioner, his or her attorneys, and the Industrial Commission; (4) a certificate of filing (the clerk's confirmation that all was properly prepared and summons issued); and (5) a receipt from the Industrial Commission indicating that the probable cost of preparing the Record ($35.00) has been paid.

All of these documents must be presented to the circuit court, approved, and filed, within the 20 days provided by the statute. While the particulars of most of these documents are matters of import only to the preparing attorney, there is one document - the bond - that must be attended to promptly and with full cooperation from the insurer and the insured. The cases in Illinois are consistent in that the failure to timely file a bond will result in the dismissal of a workers' compensation review with prejudice.

Section 19(f)(2) provides that  "[n]o such summons shall issue unless the one against whom the Commission shall have rendered an award for the payment of money shall upon the filing of his written request for such summons file with the clerk of the court a bond conditioned that if he shall not successfully prosecute the review, he will pay the award and the costs of the proceedings in the courts." The bond is set by the Commission in its decision and is to be equal to the award plus $100, with a cap of $75,000. This bond, and the surety or sureties of the bond, must be approved by the circuit court.

Our appeal bonds generally consist of a simple two-page document that tracks the language of § 19(f)(2) and provides a signature block for the client and the insurer, as surety. In the "old days," pre-1994, an attorney signed this bond for the employer and the review process typically went smoothly, for reasons that will be apparent. But, in Deichmueller Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 151 Ill. 2d 413, 603 N.E.2d 516 (1992), a case we handled before the Illinois Supreme Court, it was held that an attorney's signature on the bond on behalf of an employer did not comport with the strict language of §19(f)(2); hence, the beginning of the "mad dash" to obtain an employer's and its insured's signature within the 20-days. In recognition of the potential compliance problem Deichmueller posed, that decision was limited to prospective application only.

As might be imagined, this 20-day period can go by quickly, especially if the insurer or insured are large corporations and the appropriate people within those organizations have yet to be identified as having the authority to sign the bond.  Since Deichmueller, bonds must be signed "by the employer." This means that someone with the authority to "bind" the company, whether the insured or the insurer, must sign the bond. We have taken the position that the surety does not need to be an actual bonding company and this generally holds true outside Cook County, which, by local rules, requires a bond issued by a bonding company (the same as we do in general civil appeal).

To assist us with acquiring the appropriate signature, we suggest identifying someone within your organization with the authority to bind the company and advising them of this point, so that the signatory hunt is a short one. Generally speaking, a company Treasurer/Comptroller, Claims Department Head, Officer, or departmental manager will have such authority.  We have also taken the position that any individual identified on a corporation's 10K report has such binding authority as well. When you are self-insured, it is generally advisable to have someone of this level identified in the claims management department. To put it in the simplest terms, the bond required by § 19(f)(2) is in essence a promissory note; it does not change the obligations of the insurer to pay the award.

As you can see, the review process to the circuit court is not a simple procedure and even the most savvy workers' compensation attorney can fall into the pitfalls found in § 19(f). Indeed, this very point was seen by the batch of cases handed down by the Appellate Court, Industrial Commission Division this past spring, most of which concerned jurisdictional problems during review to the circuit court. Certainly, the members of the Appellate Court, Industrial Commission Division, understand these pitfalls and are sympathetic where possible, but they are nevertheless bound to follow the strict letter of the law. Since a circuit court's jurisdiction is statutory, it must be strictly construed; substantial compliance is seldom sufficient, and is rarely a standard applied to bond issues.

Given this, there are a few things that you can do to help us meet these deadlines and ensure that your appeal is properly perfected. First, if there is any additional evaluation that must be done before a final decision can be made as to whether an appeal should take place, we would like to at least start the bond preparation process and obtain the requisite signatures. Second, we would like the authority to request the record from the Industrial Commission and obtain the necessary receipt to exhibit to the clerk at the time of filing, should we determine that an appeal is appropriate. Securing these two time-critical items will ensure that, if the decision is made to appeal, all of the time-sensitive documents are complete and ready to file.

Since these documents can be prepared or obtained at a relatively low cost, it makes sense to have them ready to file as soon as possible. Once all review documents are perfected and the decision to appeal firm, we personally file the review documents with the circuit clerks to ensure that there are no questions or misunderstandings. Administrative reviews are both uncommon and procedurally unique, and therefore not all clerks have a great deal of experience in these matters.

CASE LAW UPDATE - Back to Table of Contents
    By:  James J. Manning (Peoria)

These represent some of the more significant decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court, the Appellate Court, Industrial Commission Division, and the Industrial Commission, over the past quarter.

Award for Stress-Induced Anxiety Denied - Back to Table of Contents - Back to WC Index

Skidis v. Industrial Comm'n, 1999 Ill. App. LEXIS 827, 722 N.E.2d 1163 (5th Dist. 1999) - Petitioner filed five separate applications seeking benefits for stress-induced anxiety, heart arrhythmia, and headaches she allegedly suffered while working as a dispatcher for the Fairview Heights Police Department in St.Clair County. Petitioner worked as a dispatcher from 1974 through 1991 and testified that in approximately 1988, she began having problems at work which she related to the increased workload and demands of productivity. She also stated that she was subjected to derogatory, racial and sexual slurs from time-to-time. However, the medical records document histories given by petitioner to her treating physicians that certain other events contributed to her anxiety, including her son joining the Marines in the early 1980s, her ex-husband dying from cancer, her fiancee dying of a heart attack, the Rodney King incident, the Gulf War, a mammogram she underwent, and her fear of developing Alzheimer's disease.

Despite a treating psychiatrist diagnosing petitioner with an adjustment disorder with anxiety which he related to petitioner's environmental stress emanating from work, the Commission refused to find the claim compensable. Relying upon prior case law requiring a "sudden, severe emotional shock traceable to a definite time, place, and cause resulting in psychological injury or harm," the Commission found that petitioner's condition accumulated over time and no one single incident at work triggered the alleged psychological trauma. In affirming the Commission's decision, the appellate court found that petitioner had failed to demonstrate that her mental condition was a product of anything other than the normal stress associated with employment, coupled with problems arising from relationships and events in her personal life.

Volunteer Average Weekly Wage - Back to Table of Contents - Back to WC Index

McDaneld v.Industrial Comm'n, 307 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 718 N.E.2d 722 (5th Dist. 1999) - Petitioner was a part-time volunteer fireman, a full-time carpenter, and a part-time life insurance salesman, and worked on a family farm. Petitioner was paid $7.50 per hour as a carpenter and his tax forms revealed that he earned $4,717.23 as a carpenter working from January1, 1993 to October31, 1993 (a period of 44weeks). He earned $2,926.96 selling life insurance part-time in 1992 and $3,630.46 selling life insurance in 1993. Petitioner testified that during the 44week period he worked as a carpenter, he did not always work every day of the week and missed more than 5days of work. The arbitrator determined average weekly wage at $109.70, by dividing petitioner's earnings as a carpenter from January1 to October31, 1993 by 43weeks (44weeks minus 5days of missed work). (The parties agreed at the hearing that petitioner's regular work was that of a carpenter and that only his earnings as a carpenter would be used to calculate his average weekly wage.)

The Commission affirmed the arbitrator's decision, finding that his method of computation complied with §10. It rejected petitioner's argument that his hourly wage rate ($7.50) should be multiplied by the number of hours he was scheduled to work per week (40), to yield a higher average weekly wage of $300. On review, the appellate court emphasized that § 10 of the Act makes it clear that if a claimant works during a large portion of the year preceding his injury, the Commission shall calculate the average weekly wage by dividing actual regular earnings by the period during which the claimant worked. The court found that petitioner's 44week pay period in question could not be regarded as a "short or casual" employment which would otherwise justify a computation of the average weekly wage based upon petitioner's probable regular weekly earnings.

Wage Differential - Back to Table of Contents - Back to WC Index

Smith v.Industrial Comm'n, 308 Ill. App. 3d 260, 719 N.E.2d 329 (3d Dist. 1999), reh'g denied (Nov. 18, 1999) - The appellate court reversed the  Commission and found that petitioner was entitled to a wage differential award, despite evidence that petitioner was earning the same wages in her post-injury job as in her pre-injury job, where defendant artificially raised post-injury wages in an attempt to avoid paying §8(d)(1) benefits. The appellate court found that the wages paid by respondent at the time of hearing were artificially raised above what was normally paid for the job she was performing and therefore did not constitute "earned" wages. The court awarded a wage differential between petitioner's actual earning capacity based upon her functional impairment and the rate of pay she would have earned if she had successfully obtained a promotion if not for her impairment.

Authorization for Treatment - Back to Table of Contents - Back to WC Index

Quintero v. F&B Manufacturing Co., 90 WC 43699, 99 IIC 0661 (July13, 1999) - The Commission held that instructions provided by the hospital emergency room, which suggested that claimant see a certain doctor or a doctor of her choice for follow-up care, constituted a referral under §8(a). After receiving follow-up care at the hospital on three occasions, she received a form from the hospital instructing her to have a follow-up visit with either a doctor designated on the form or a doctor of her own choosing. Upon receiving these instructions, claimant contacted her family doctor who referred her to a doctor at a clinic, who prescribed therapy and pain medication and returned claimant to light duty work. Because she continued with neck and back problems, another doctor at the clinic recommended a psychiatric consultation. While receiving therapy in orthopedic services from the pain clinic, claimant began receiving chiropractic care from another clinic by two chiropractors. One of the chiropractors referred claimant for a neurologic consultation. At the suggestion of a friend, claimant saw another doctor, who conducted an EMG and an MRI and referred claimant to a neurosurgeon. The Commission found that respondent was libel for reasonable and necessary medical expenses for treatment by the family doctor, the doctors at the first clinic to whom she was referred by the family doctor and the psychiatric referral, finding that this treatment was within the chain of claimant's initial provider - the emergency care provider at the hospital.

Copy Fees Under § 16 - Back to Table of Contents - Back to WC Index

Clayton v. Ingalls Mem. Hosp., 2000 Ill. App. LEXIS 2, 724 N.E.2d 222 (1st Dist., Jan. 6, 2000), No. 1-98-3689 - The appellate court held that §16 of the Workers' Compensation Act requires a person issuing a Commission subpoena duces tecum to pay only a $20 per day witness fee and a $.20 per mile travel fee to the deponent and that §16 does not require the subpoenaing party to pay any per page copy fees, retrieval fees, or any other expenses claimed by the subpoenaed entity. In Clayton, petitioner's counsel had subpoenaed records from petitioner's treating hospital. Midwest Medical Records responded that the records could be reviewed and copied for a retrieval fee, and a per page copy charge.  The court left open, however, whether a subpoena under §16 was proper where no hearing had been set because none of the parties had moved to quash it.  This, unfortunately, leaves some room for future objections by subpoenaed entities.

We recommend the entire opinion be read and counsel consulted concerning the effect these decisions may have upon your claims.